Synchronization protocols based on "dead-reckoning" are vulnerable to a very popular type of cheat called speed hack. A speed hack essentially speeds up all actions of a cheater and thus the cheater can moves, explores and gathers items faster than honest players and therefore gains unfair advantages. This paper presents an enhanced version of the dead-reckoning protocol that is invulnerable to speed hacks. Existing games based on dead-reckoning can be easily modified to use this hack-proof protocol. We demonstrate how the protocol works on both client-server architecture and peerto-peer architecture.
INTRODUCTION
Modern multi-player online games are so popular and attractive because they provide a sense of virtual world: players can interact with each other over the Internet while still perceive that other players are just playing the game over a local area network. To make this possible, most modern multi-player online games use similar networking architecture that aims to hide the effects of network latency, packet loss, and high variance of delay from players. Because real-time interactivity is the most important feature from a player's point of view, any delay perceived by the player can affect his/her performance [8] . Therefore, the game client must be able to run and accept new user commands continuously regardless of the condition of the underlying communication channel, and not to stop respond because of waiting for other players' update. To make this possible, multi-player online games typically use protocols based on "dead-reckoning" which allows for loose synchronization between players.
However, dead-reckoning protocol opens to some security attack or exploitation. In particular the type of cheat that exploits this vulnerability is called speed hack and it becomes so wildly available and easily accessible because the implementation of a speed hack is very simply. Speed hack cheats exist for virtually all popular commercial multi-player online games. Existing countermeasures target on the cheats themselves, i.e. scan for and block any known cheating software, or observe for any abnormal network traffic and kick that player out from the game. These methods cannot guard against all potential speed hacks, and honest players may be accidentally recognized as cheaters.
This paper presents an enhanced dead-reckoning protocol that is invulnerable to speed hacks fundamentally. Since our protocol is based on conventional dead-reckoning protocol, existing games can be easily modified to become speed hack resistant. Our protocol can be adapted to both client-server architecture and peer-to-peer architecture in much the same way.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, backgrounds on dead-reckoning and speed hack is presented. In Section 3, we present our hack-proof dead-reckoning protocol. Related works on similar fields is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
BACKGROUNDS

Dead-Reckoning
Synchronization protocols based on dead-reckoning [4] , [2] , [6] are commonly used to hide network latency from players. In a game using the dead-reckoning protocol, each client sends update to the server (on client-server architecture) or to the peers (on peer-topeer architecture) at a constant update interval instead of each state change. An update packet consists of the timestamp when the update take place, and a dead-reckoning vector consists of the current position and angular speed of the player's avatar.
If a client only renders moving avatars to the new position reported at each update, animation would look choppy and jittery. Packet loss would also cause noticeable glitches. To overcome these problems, a solution is that all clients shift back an update interval for the graphics rendering. The clients can then render the graphics at a rate faster than the rate of state update, where the position of each avatar between two successive updates can be computed by interpolation. For example, refers to Figure 1 where a simple linear interpolation is used, a player P sends an update at time t0 reports his/her avatar's position at (x0, y0) and then sends an update at time t1 reports his/her avatar's position at (x1, y1). In this example, each player sends update at an 500ms interval. Since all players shifted back an update interval, i.e. 500ms, for the graphics rendering, at time t + 500ms a player Q will render P's position reported at time t, which is given by interpolation Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
If an update packet is lost, interpolation cannot work and extrapolation from the last two known positions must be used instead. Extrapolation works in a much similar way as interpolation, but infer from two positions both in the past, thus is a kind of prediction. For example, refers to Figure 1 , if at time t + 500ms Q renders P's position reported at time t but the update from P at time t2 is not available. Q cannot interpolate P's position from (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) because (x2, y2) is missing. Instead, Q extrapolate P's position by extrapolation
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Interpolates (x, y) from (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) and extrapolates (x , y ) from (x0, y0) and (x1, y1).
Speed Hack
Although under dead-reckoning protocol, all players can have a perception of smooth gameplay even though the underlying communication channel is in fact error-prone, congested and has high delay variance, it opens the vulnerability for a form of popular cheat, which is called speed hack. Under speed hack, a cheater can speed up all actions of his game and gain an unfair advantage over other players. A speed hack essentially speeds up a cheater's game client, by techniques such as altering the software programmable timer, or library calls which are used by the game client to control the pace of the game. The cheater therefore can moves his/her avatar faster in the speeded up client. Under dead-reckoning, the game client will reports the position of the avatar in the update packet faithfully as perceived by the cheater, thereby all other players will also renders the cheater's avatar moving at a faster speed. Figure 2a and 2b illustrate the views of two interacting honest players P and Q respectively. In the figures P is moving upward while Q stays motionless. P sends two updates at time tn and tn+1 respectively, giving Q the information to render the two opaque avatars correspond to P's position reported at time tn and tn+1 respectively. However, when rendering P's position between time tn and tn+1, Q interpolates the position from the two opaque avatars to fill in the gaps. Figure 2c and 2d illustrate the views of two interacting players P and Q respectively, where P is using a speed hack. In the figures P is moving upward while Q stays motionless. The speed hack speeded up P's game client so that P is able to move at a faster speed and therefore traveled farther at time tn+1 compared to Figure 2a . When update take place at tn+1, P's dead-reckoning vector will state the same position that P perceives. Therefore Q will renders P's avatar moving at a faster speed compared to 2b.
HACK-PROOF SYNCHRONIZATION PRO-TOCOL
In this section, we present an enhanced dead-reckoning protocol that is invulnerable to speed-hacks. Conventional dead-reckoning protocol is vulnerable to speed hacks since the position of an avatar is stated in each update packet directly and is trusted by other players. Our hack-proof protocol eliminates the need to expose an avatar's position directly in any update packet, but the maximum velocity and a set of update parameters of an avatar are used to determinate the avatar's position at each update. Our protocol works on the fact that a game server grants and authorizes the change of all game states of all players. For example, each player should has an initial position and velocity authorized by the server, however, a player may obtain different virtual items or gain points during the game that allows the player's avatar to move at a faster speed. The assertion that the player obtained the item and increased in speed are all authorized by the server thereby the velocity of each player is centralized on the server. On peer-to-peer games, the role of the server is distributed across all game clients, the assertion and authorization are carried out by peers instead of the server and therefore the velocity of each player is known and agreed among all players.
Throughout this section, we assume the game server and all game clients are synchronized to a global clock, algorithm such as the NTP [7] can be used to achieve this purpose, but the discussion of such algorithm is beyond the scope of this paper.
Speed-Hack-Proof Dead-Reckoning
At each update, instead of sending the position and angular velocity directly, a player P sends the current timestamp and three parameters F , R1 and R2 to the server as illustrated in Figure 3 . The solid arrowed line represents the actual path taken by P's avatar, the two points M (x1, y1) and R(x2, y2) on the path indicate P's position when updates take place at time tn and tn+1 respectively.
To illustrate how to compute the three parameters at time tn+1, we constructs a triangle MST such that the line SRT is extended from the avatar's velocity vector, and RT meet MT at T such that the included angle is 360
• − R2 as shown in Figure 4 . Let d be the length of the real path MNOPQR taken by the avatar and length of SR be l, we are going to find l such that the total length of the two The value of l is given by
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Having l, we then can compute the parameter F by
And finally we can compute R1 by
Working Example: We now use an example to illustrate the computation of the update parameters and illustrate how a server, or a peer paper, can compute the update position and angular velocity on receiving the update parameters. Refers to Figure 5 , let player P was at M (15, 18) at time tn = 14900ms and at time tn+1 = 15000ms P moved d = 8 units to R(20, 20) heading at polar angle 315
• . P computes that R2 = 315
2.9768589 − 8 R1 = 54.8063918
• On receiving the update packet (timestamp, F , R1, R2), the server computes the time elapsed between P's latest two updates as tn+1− tn = 15000 − 14900 = 100ms, and use the velocity of P, i.e. 0.08 units/ms, to compute that d = 0.08 * 100 = 8units. To illustrate the computation of P's position, we construct two triangles as shown in Figure 6 . First, the server computes the coordinate of S by which is the correct position of P at t = 14900ms, and the angular velocity of P is simply given by R2 = 315 • .
Completeness of the Protocol
In this section, we use different scenarios to illustrate some additional issues and illustrate how the protocol can handle these cases.
Scenario 1:
We re-define the value of d for a greater generality. Refers to Figure 7 , Suppose player P has moved and stopped occasionally, or has accelerated and decelerated occasionally, between time tn and time tn+1 so that the total length of the path P taken is shorter than the maximum possible length if P moved non-stop at P's maximum velocity. We now re-define the value of d to be d = maximum velocity of P * time elapsed
where maximum velocity of P is the game state "velocity" of P which is granted and agreed by the server or among all peer players. Therefore, when P computes the update parameters and when the server computes P's position from the update parameters, P and server will have the same value of d and the correct position of P can be determinate by the server even P has stopped or decelerated since the previous update.
avator's motion path, not moving at full speed Figure 7 : Player P has decelerated or stopped between time tn and tn+1, therefore the path MR taken by P is shorter than d = MS + SR.
Scenario 2:
Suppose player P has not moved since the last update at time tn and remains stationary at time tn+1, therefore, the final displacement is zero and the angular velocity is undefined. In this scenario, P simply use F = 0.5 and R1 = NULL to notice the server, or peer players, not to render any movement until the next update. Notice that the update parameter R2 is still useful in this scenario, because P may have changed the angular position (has local motion) since time tn but without having any global motion. The value of R2 tells other players to render P's avatar facing to the direction R2.
Proof of Invulnerability
We prove that our protocol is resistant against speed hack, even if the cheat is able to modify the data in any update packet.
Proof: Refers to Figure 6 , the farthest distance a player P can travel between two successive updates is given by
The maximum velocity of P is authorized on the server side, or on peer players, therefore P cannot spoof its value. Time elapsed is given by time elapsed = timestamp of current update −timestamp of previous update
Since the server and all players are synchronized to the same global clock, P cannot spoof a larger value of timestamp in any update packet intends to produce a larger value of elapsed time. Hence the invulnerability of the protocol is proved.
RELATED WORKS
In [1] , the authors describe a type of cheat called suppress-correct cheat and propose a cheat-proof protocol that resists this type of cheat. Suppose a cheater S using the suppress-correct cheat, S purposefully drop n packets while receiving n packets from each of other players. Therefore, other players are forced to extrapolate the movement of S for n timeframes but cannot confirm where S really is. S then can construct the n + 1th packet based on the knowledges of the previous n timeframes that provides some advantages. To eliminate suppress-correct cheat, the authors proposed a synchronization technique called asynchronous synchronization (AS). Using AS, each host advances in time asynchronously from the other players but enters into the lockstep mode when interaction occurs. When entered the lockstep mode, at every timeframe t each involved player must wait for all packets from other players before advance to timeframe t + 1. Because this is a stop-and-wait protocol, extrapolation cannot be used to smooth out any delay caused by network latency.
In [5] , the authors improve the performance of the lockstep protocol by adding pipelines. Extrapolation is still not allowed under the pipelined lockstep protocol, therefore, if there is increased network latency and packets are delayed, the game must stall.
In [3] , the authors propose the sliding pipeline protocol that dynamically adjusts the pipeline depth to reflect current network conditions. The authors also introduce a send buffer to hold the commands generated while the pipeline size is adjusted. The sliding pipeline protocol allows for extrapolation to smooth out jitters.
Although these protocols are designed to defend against the suppresscorrect cheat, it can also prevent speed hacks, when entered into the lock-step mode, because players are forced to synchronize within a bounded amount of timeframes. However, speed hack can still be effective when lock-step mode is not activated. And since these protocols do not allow packets be dropped, any lost packet must be retransmitted until it is finally sent and acknowledged, therefore the minimum timeframe of the game cannot be shorter than the maximum latency of the player with the slowest connection, all clients must run the game at a speed that the slowest client can support. Furthermore, any sudden increase in the latency will cause jitter to all players, which is very unpleasant.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a synchronization protocol for multiplayer online games that supports dead-reckoning and meanwhile invulnerable to a very common type of cheat called speed-hack. The general idea is that the server or peer players can use the max-imum velocity of an avatar to compute its position from a set of update parameters, which eliminates the need to state the avatar's position directly in the update packets. Even if the cheater is able to modify the data in the update packets, the cheater cannot spoof other players to render a faster moving avatar because the distance an avatar can travel is now bounded by the maximum velocity of a player that is authorized by the server (on client-server architecture) or among all players (on peer-to-peer architecture).
